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This paper aims to enrich the behavioral theory of international business strategy
by investigating how CEO hubris (i.e., excess pride and confidence) affects inter-
national strategic choices, that is, location selection, entry timing, and modes of
entry into the target market. Specifically, we focus on the relationship between
cultural distance and international strategic choices and consider hubris as a mech-
anism that influences CEOs’ decisions. Our conceptual framework recognizes that
the performance of international strategies managed by hubristic CEOs is
extremely volatile. On the one hand, we corroborate the idea that hubris has a
dark side that may lead to pernicious outcomes. On the other hand, we recognize
a bright side of hubris related to the consideration that overconfidence may some-
times be seen as a necessary CEO quality that in turn differentiates one firm from
the others.
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INTRODUCTION
The international business (IB) literature identifies vari-
ous antecedents affecting the decision of a firm to enter a
foreign country (Hitt et al., 2006). Most of such literature
has focused on the various elements characterizing inter-
national strategy decisions (e.g., distance between home
and foreign countries, endowment of resources, demand
conditions and so on) and decisions whether to enter a
new country on the basis of its potential difficulties
(Nielsen et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2017).
We are particularly interested in the behavioral theory
of strategy, which advocates the opportunity to combine
psychology with the IB literature to bring “theory closer to
the empirical fact” (Powell et al., 2011, p. 1371): an
approach enriching our knowledge on what CEOs perceive
and do when they sense the opportunity to enter a foreign
market (Gavetti, 2012; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015b).
According to the behavioral theory of strategy, the diver-
sity of CEOs’ psychological attributes represents a poten-
tial explanation for some of the mixed empirical
observations found regarding the antecedents of IB (Hitt
et al., 2006) as well as the contradictory performance of
international strategy (Wiersema & Bowen, 2011).
Within the behavioral theory of strategy, the concept
of hubris has recently gained attention. Hubris manifests
“when an individual has excessive pride, an inflated sense
of self-confidence, and makes self-evaluations in terms of
talent, ability, and accomplishment that are much more
positive than any reasonable objective assessment would
otherwise suggest” (Judge et al., 2009, p. 867). Research
on hubris looks outside of the mere reasonable analyses
resting behind strategy decisions, thereby implying the
possibility that CEOs may decide on a different basis vis-
à-vis on a rational and scrupulous examination of the
data they have at hand. In fact, an analysis of real busi-
ness cases shows that CEOs might exhibit deep trust and
overestimate their own abilities (Dagnino et al., 2013;
Eckhaus & Sheaffer, 2018). As a consequence, this cogni-
tive bias may drive them toward decisions to internation-
alize that may not be supported by a thorough rational
analysis.
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The literature on hubris has advanced in IB with a
narrow scope, usually with a special focus on how hubris
(or overconfidence) affects entry modes into foreign mar-
kets (Seth et al., 2000; Lai et al., 2017). Actually, this lim-
ited focus occurs since the behavioral theory of strategy
lacks a holistic approach for examining how hubris bias
reveals itself in IB. Specifically, insufficient attention has
been hitherto devoted to both the potentially negative
and positive consequences of hubris, which may have
crucial importance in explaining certain decisions and
outcomes of international expansion (e.g., Picone
et al., 2014; Sundermeier et al., 2020).
In this article, we investigate the differences among
CEOs assessing their firms’ international strategy as con-
cerns hubris. Specifically, we focus on cultural distance
(i.e., the degree to which the cultural values of a coun-
try and its commonly accepted standards of behaviors
differ from those of another country; Sousa &
Bradley, 2006) and consider hubris as a mechanism that
influences CEOs’ decisions. Two reasons motivate the
focus of our investigation. First, the IB literature credits
importance to cultural distance (CD) and unveils high
heterogeneity among CEOs in assessing it (Sousa &
Bradley, 2006; Beugelsdijk et al., 2018). Therefore, we
aim to understand whether (or not) the presence of
hubris may be one of the possible explanations for such
heterogeneity.
Second, hubris shapes how individuals process infor-
mation and reach an ultimate decision under conditions
of uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Li, 2018).
Accordingly, the importance of hubris emerges in the
high-stakes conditions when selecting IB strategies, par-
ticularly in culturally distant contexts (Powell
et al., 2011; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a). Overall,
we aim to build a conceptual framework regarding CEO
hubris in assessing CD. We investigate the role of
CEO hubris in the decision to enter a foreign market and
the set of choices regarding the selection of the target
location, the right entry timing, and the most suitable
entry mode. Then, we illustrate why the outcome of an
internationalization path managed by hubristic CEOs
may produce both negative and positive performance
outcomes.
Our contribution to the extant literature is threefold.
First, we explore certain key aspects through which CEO
hubris affects decisions regarding internationalization.
Arguably, the extant literature posits the existence of a
link between hubris/overconfidence and risky business
endeavors (e.g., Simon & Houghton, 2003; Galasso &
Simcoe, 2011; Robinson & Marino, 2015) – such as
acquisitions (Seth et al., 2000; Lai, Lin, & Chen, 2017) -
and the areas of international growth strategies. None-
theless, while the link between hubris and acquisitions
signaling increased complexity is well known, no such
link has been studied concerning international growth
strategies. Hence, this study complements prior literature
on the role of CEOs in selecting various
internationalization choices (e.g., Aharoni et al., 2011;
Devinney, 2011; Hennart & Slangen, 2015). We conclude
that hubris bias acts as a potential explanation for the
mixed empirical observations found regarding the ante-
cedents and performance in IB.
Second, this paper builds on the premise that, like a
coin, hubris has two sides (Hayward et al., 2010; Picone
et al., 2014; Zeitoun et al., 2019). On the one hand, we
argue that CEO hubris may induce the selection of overly
ambitious and risky international strategies (Li &
Tang, 2010). As a consequence, hubris may lead to cata-
strophic performance outcomes. On the other hand,
hubris may sometimes be seen as a necessary quality of
such individuals, differentiating them from others.
Accordingly, CEO hubris may help develop the firms’
ability to capture “cognitively distant” opportunities
(Gavetti, 2012) due to CD and thus play a positive role in
firm internationalization.
Third, we contribute to studies on the role of CD in
IB choices. While the extant literature has long investi-
gated the relationship between CD and foreign entry
strategies (Beugelsdijk et al., 2018) in an attempt to deter-
mine how the former exerts influence on the latter, we
call attention to CEOs’ psychological attributes in mod-
erating such relations.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we present
the antecedents of internationalization choices with a spe-
cial focus on CD and summarize the literature on hubris.
Then, it provides a synthetic explanation of our concep-
tual framework that will be discussed in the following
sections. Finally, we present our conclusion and discuss
future lines of research. To facilitate the reader’s under-




Internationalization represents “a strategy through which
a firm expands the sales of its goods or services across the
borders of global regions and countries into different geo-
graphic locations or markets” (Hitt et al., 2007, p. 251).
Once the decision to enter a foreign market is made, its
implementation strategy requires a set of choices regard-
ing the location selection, the entry timing, and the entry
mode. Usually, CEOs consider the abovementioned
choices simultaneously.1 Taken together, they provide a
comprehensive view of how international growth works.
Arguably, the strategic choices by which firms enter for-
eign countries display high levels of complexity, incom-
plete information, and uncertain outcomes (Nielsen &
Nielsen, 2011; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a). The
uncertainty characterizing a new context the firm aims to
enter makes the decision process extremely intricate
(Le Masson et al., 2019), especially when it is executed
through rational analyses.
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While we acknowledge that firm internationalization
requires a systematic inspection of several factors (Hitt
et al., 2007), we also recognize that some of its anteced-
ents, such as CD, are usually challenging to assess. For
this reason, the IB literature has extensively tried to
investigate the relationship between CD and foreign entry
strategies (e.g., entry mode) in an attempt to determine
how the former influences the latter. Specifically, scholars
have tried to disentangle the CEO’s decision process by
focusing on the implications produced by the
uncertainties characterizing an investment into a new and
“culturally distant” country (Reus & Lamont, 2009). As
Lopez-Duarte and colleagues argued (2016, p. 397),
culture “arises as a key factor conditioning not only the
decision of internationalization, but also the choice of
host countries, the selection of entry mode strategies, the
internationalized firms’ organizational design, transfer of
knowledge and management of human resources, as well
as the final performance of the process”. In addition, IB
studies consider CD to have a central role in determining
frequent heterogeneities among managers’ perceptions
(Beugelsdijk et al., 2018).
Cultural distance as a crucial antecedent of
internationalization choices
In IB studies, common wisdom highlights that the higher
the CD between the home and the host country is, the
less knowledge about the latter is likely to be available to
new entrants (Eriksson et al., 2000). This condition
implies that, when a firm decides to enter a culturally dis-
tant country, it should adjust to its characteristics and to
its inner challenges, with special care to crucial heteroge-
neities, such as those regarding language and jargon, life-
styles, beliefs, consumer preferences, and commonly
accepted standards of behavior (Lopez-Duarte & Vidal-
Suarez, 2010). In addition, CD affects the selection of the
investment timing (Ganesh et al., 1997) and entry mode
(Meschi & Riccio, 2008; Chang et al., 2012). The
TABLE 1 Key concept definitions used in this paper





“Behavioral strategy merges cognitive and social
psychology with strategic management theory
and practice. Behavioral strategy aims to bring
realistic assumptions about human cognition,
emotions, and social behavior to the strategic
management of organizations and, thereby, to
enrich strategy theory, empirical research, and
real-world practice”
Powell et al., 2011, p. 1731
Decision-making Decision-making regards “the processes involved
in choosing a firm’s strategy”
Fahey, 1981, p. 43
Bias “Cognitive dispositions to respond” Croskerry, 2002, p. 1184
Hubris “Overconfidence mixed with excessive pride” Picone et al., 2014, p. 447
International Business Internationalization “A strategy through which a firm expands the sales
of its goods or services across the borders of
global regions and countries into different
geographic locations or markets”
Hitt et al., 2007, p. 251
Cultural distance “The degree to which cultural values in one
country are different from those in another
country. Instead of assessing the individual’s
perception of differences, the CD concept uses
cultural values to assess the distance among
countries and not individuals”
Sousa & Bradley, 2006, p.
52
Location The market a firm selects for a new foreign entry Kang & Jiang, 2012
Entry timing The time within which a firm decides to enter a
new market
Zachary et al., 2015
Ownership mode Two specific types of ownership characterize entry
modes: (a) shared ownership modes, such as
the establishment of a joint venture with a local
partner or a partial acquisition; (b) full
ownership modes, such as a greenfield wholly
owned subsidiary or a full acquisition
Brouthers & Hennart, 2007
Establishment mode Two specific types of establishment mode
characterize entry modes: greenfield vs.
acquisition
Brouthers & Hennart, 2007
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uncertainty characterizing the target country should
rationally suggest caution (Slangen & Van Tulder, 2009)
to avoid rushing too early and possibly the gathering of
additional information before entry (Anderson &
Gatignon, 1986). In terms of location, firms deciding to
invest abroad tend to circumvent target countries they
consider to be culturally distant (Gielens &
Dekimpe, 2007). Finally, the higher the distance is, the
lower the familiarity with the country (Gomez-Mejia &
Palich, 1997). Therefore, the rational perception of dis-
tance should suggest low-control entry modes, at least in
the initial stage, to contain the risk of incurring serious
losses (Meschi & Riccio, 2008). Table 2 reports the main
aspects of the relationship between CD and international
strategic choices tested in IB.
CEOS’ HUBRIS
The term hubris delineates an excess of confidence about
being correct (or obtaining a certain outcome) combined
with excessive pride (Judge et al., 2009; Picone
et al., 2014). In other words, it defines “the tendency of
individuals to overestimate their abilities” (Hill
et al., 2012, p. 188). In fact, people affected by hubris
“have unwarranted confidence in their fallible judgment”
(Neale & Bazerman, 1985, p. 39).2 A kind of escalation
exists when moving from confidence to hubris. While con-
fidence is grounded in a rational process of categorization
and evaluation of information (Gist & Mitchell, 1992;
Bandura, 1997), hubristic CEOs manage information in
trusting and unwise fashion (Li & Sullivan, 2020),
thereby conferring high importance to chances of success
due to their contribution. The boundary line between
confidence and hubris regards how people process infor-
mation. Hubristic CEOs process information in a non-
critical manner and consider their point of view to be free
of errors. As a consequence, regardless of the information
other people possess, hubristic CEOs show absolute faith
in their ability to achieve target outcomes. Moreover,
hubristic CEOs show an excess of pride and believe that
their capabilities and performance are more effective and
outstanding than other people’s.
For further clarification, psychological studies argue
that hubris is shaped by stimuli “evoked by a specific trig-
ger (power), and usually [reduced] when power fades”
(Owen & Davidson, 2009, p. 1397). Remarkably, hubris
does not emerge as fully formed when CEOs are emp-
owered to formulate strategy, but it rather rises over time
as an incremental function of CEOs achieving success
and obtaining appreciation for their good performance
(Claxton et al., 2015; Asad & Sadler-Smith, 2020). Hay-
ward & Hambrick (1997) argue that firms’ recent success
boosts CEOs’ core self-evaluation (Hilary &
Menzly, 2006). Similarly, media admiration and frequent
prestigious awards assigned to CEOs play important
roles in molding their self-perception. Overall, hubris
emerges in CEOs when environmental factors lead them
to develop an overblown perception of self-esteem. These
factors may reinforce their pride and sense of distinctive-
ness and exceptionality; that is, they may develop the
idea that their contribution to firm success is truly unique
and extraordinary (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).
The strategic management literature investigates the
consequences of hubris at both the theoretical and
empirical levels (Picone et al., 2014; Sadler-Smith
et al., 2017). In particular, such literature focuses on the
following:
1. on the negative side, studies commonly demonstrate
the dramatic consequences of CEOs’ choices; and
2. on the positive side, studies observe that hubris is
sometimes necessary to commit stakeholders to
CEOs’ risky initiatives (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992;
Bollaert & Petit, 2010).
Because it is commonly identified with its negatively
accepted meaning, some scholars connect hubris to
CEOs’ preference to adopt high-flying strategies that
may easily lead to a disaster. From this perspective,
hubris (or overconfidence) has been employed in manage-
ment as technical jargon to explain acquisition failures
(Roll, 1986; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier &
Tate, 2008), unsuccessful investments (Zacharakis &
Shepherd, 2001), and irresponsible corporate social
events (Dagnino et al., 2013; Cormier et al., 2016;
McManus, 2018).
A decade ago, Hayward et al. (2010, p. 576) posited
that “by focusing on focal judgments, hubris theory
may rush to the erroneous conclusion that over-
confidence necessarily hurts actors, their organizations
and societies.” From this perspective, Picone
et al. (2014) conceptualized the bright side of hubris:
managers sometimes need to overestimate their own
abilities; otherwise, the fear of producing losses would
likely stop many of them from running the inner risk of
making crucial strategic decisions. Interestingly, some
scholars focus on this bright side of hubris to explain
how certain hubristic CEOs may formulate inspiring
strategies and thereby be able to motivate their fol-
lowers, touch employees’ passion, and stimulate their
pride and commitment (Shipman & Mumford, 2011).
As such, a recent study shows that hubristic CEOs play
a facilitating role in the starting phase of green innova-
tive projects (Arena et al., 2018). In addition, referring
to competitive contexts characterized by uncertainty
and complexity (i.e., industries in which the competitive
advantage is less or nonsustainable, Dagnino
et al., 2021), Zeitoun et al. (2019, p. 649) argue that the
premise that hubristic CEOs do not search for “counter-
factual thinking facilitates the entrepreneurs’ decision to
start a business (a beneficial effect).” In addition,
Sundermeier et al. (2020, p. 1061) found that hubristic
decision makers’ “unshakable belief in their inevitable
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TABLE 2 The relationship between CD and internationalization choices: A rational perspective
Key arguments Main reference(s)
Location choice CD is among the most influential
“determinants of foreign direct
investment location patterns”
Davidson, 1980, p. 9
CD creates knowledge entry barriers and
hampers the transfer of knowledge and
capabilities to foreign locations
Anand & Delios, 1997
CD between different locations may be
reduced by “the presence of ethnic
minorities sharing language, religion,
and history with the population” of the
entering firm. Overall, firms prefer
locations that are “culturally closer to
their home country”
Mariotti & Piscitello, 1995, p. 818 and p.
824
The more experienced are the firms are,
the higher the will to move to more
distant locations
Firms are assumed to successively enter
markets withincreasing levels of CD
with respect to their home country
Benito & Gripsrud, 1999; Johanson &
Vahlne, 1990.
Entry timing choice CD determines uncertainty, and “firms
choose foreign market entry timing
strategies based on their perceptions
and evaluations of the uncertainties
and rewards inherent with early versus
late entry into that market”
Stevens & Dykes, 2013, p. 387
Goods spread out quickly within countries
characterized by considerable degree
of cultural and economic similarity in
comparison to the first international
penetration
Ganesh et al., 1997
Cultural issues are important for the
timing of foreign direct investment,
“revealing CD as a significant barrier
in multinational banking expansion”
Blandon, 2001, p. 223
Entry mode choice: ownership mode “Both greater target country risk and
greater cultural distance reduce the
likelihood of using higher-commitment
entry strategies”
Quer et al., 2007, p. 74
When CD distance is great,“low-control
levels are more efficient than
intermediate levels”
Anderson & Gatignon, 1986, p. 18
CD leads to the selection of the joint
venture as the entry mode
Dadzie et al., 2018
Entry mode choice: establishment mode CD regards different organizational
practices, managerial practices, and
communication styles
CD makes it challenging to integrate firms
into a corporate network after the
acquisition. Then, firms prefer entering
through greenfield investments
Hennart & Park, 1993; Kogut &
Singh, 1988
The influence of culture on the integration
process of acquisitions is critical for
the achievement of integration
benefits. There is a strong inverse
relationship between perceptions of
CDs and shareholder gains in
acquisitions
Chatterjee et al., 1992; Olie, 1990
(Continues)
THE BRIGHT AND DARK SIDES OF CEO HUBRIS: ASSESSING CULTURAL DISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 5
success positively influences the internal motivation
among their employees who are thus persuaded to sup-
port the exploitation processes.”
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We build our conceptual framework focusing on the role
of CEO hubris in the choice of different internationaliza-
tion options (see Figure 1). We apply a reductionist
approach to the behavioral theory of the firm by focusing
on the “rules that people seem to use when evaluating
uncertainty” (Barnes, 1984, p. 129). We attempt to under-
stand how hubristic CEOs “scan, evaluate, discard, and
embrace different international strategy options”
(Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a, p. 1554). First, we
focus on the link between CEO hubris and the choice to
grow firms internationally. Then, we clarify the role CEO
hubris plays in three key aspects of internationalization:
(a) location selection; (b) right entry timing; and (c) the
most suitable entry mode. We focus on these main strate-
gic choices that define the direction of long-term interna-
tional growth in the light of CD. Together, they delineate
the entrant’s international strategy and its main objec-
tives. In such a way, we offer a nuanced picture of why
firms managed by hubristic CEOs show heterogeneous
performance outcomes.
In developing the framework, a parsimonious
approach requires the selection of a few factors that are
seemingly relevant for selecting the abovementioned
choices. Consistent with our literature review, we focus
on the relationship between CD and international strate-
gic choices and consider hubris as a mechanism that
comes into play and exerts influence on CEOs’ decisions.
Finally, taking into account the peculiarity of the interna-
tional growth path managed by hubristic CEOs, our
framework suggests the existence of both a “bright side”
and a “dark side” of hubris.
THE DECISION TO ENTER A FOREIGN
COUNTRY
Drawing on the behavioral theory of strategy, we posit
that hubris affects the way some CEOs manage the firm
internationalization strategy (Gavetti, 2012). “Because of
limited information processing capacity and information
overload, the human brain cannot process all external
stimuli simultaneously” (Ocasio, 2011, p. 1287). In
this perspective, we focus on the way hubris shapes
such stimuli (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). We first
argue that, although hubristic CEOs are aware of their
value maximization3 task, hubris manifests in their
choice to “engage in empire building for its own sake”
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Key arguments Main reference(s)
CD is usually associated with a negative
performance of acquisitions and rarely
withgood performance
Datta & Puia, 1995; Morosini et al., 1998
“Large differences in national culture
reduce foreign acquisition performance
if the acquired unit is tightly integrated
into the acquirer, but they [may]
enhance acquisition performance if
post-acquisition integration is limited”
Slangen, 2006, p. 161
F I GURE 1 Hubris-driven international
growth: A conceptual framework
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(Kroll et al., 2000, p. 118). An international decision
implies both ongoing development and firm transforma-
tion “in terms of scope, business idea, […] dominating
values and converging norms” (Melin, 1992, p. 101).
Hence, hubristic CEOs are willing to internationalize
because they genuinely feel that such growth is controlla-
ble and effectively pursuable when conducted under their
guidance and experience (Debrulle & Maes, 2015).
Additionally, in the IB literature, no consensus exists
about the performance results of firm internationaliza-
tion (Hitt et al., 2016). Accordingly, conflicting advice is
presented to CEOs (Hitt et al., 2006). Nonetheless,
hubristic CEOs are passionately disposed to accept
difficult challenges (Griffin & Tversky, 1992), “as they
tend to believe themselves to be better at difficult tasks
than at easy ones” (Tang et al., 2015, p. 1702).
Furthermore, hubristic CEOs often tend to overvalue
the potential benefits associated with internationaliza-
tion. Regardless of their strategic leadership capabilities,
hubristic CEOs show higher confidence than other
individuals in their capability to make the right
responses to new opportunities and challenges (Hiller &
Hambrick, 2005). They may generate excessively optimis-
tic projections concerning international growth.
Finally, CEOs affected by hubris show an excess of
pride that explains their need to succeed and, even more
importantly, the need for such success to be fully recog-
nized within their firms and by their stakeholders.
Accordingly, not only hubristic CEOs are inclined to
formulate international strategies, but also experience a
thrill when undertaking ambitious strategies. Therefore:
Proposition 1 The higher the CEO’s hubris is,
the higher the probability a firm will pursue
an internationalization path.
The location choice
The location choice is crucial to internationalization per-
formance for different stakeholders (Makino et al., 2004;
Keršuliene et al., 2010). Location choice is the outcome
of assessment processes in which estimated returns and
expenses should be carefully weighed. Past research
focuses on the cultural, administrative, geographic, and
economic distance among countries (Ghemawat, 2001).
These aspects represent the main factors influencing loca-
tion selection (Slangen & Van Tulder, 2009).
In the IB literature, common knowledge shows that
firms investing in culturally distant countries face higher
levels of uncertainty than those operating in countries
that are culturally closer (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977,
2009; Heidenreich et al., 2015). The uncertainty of a
given location is molded by the lack of effective
comprehension of the local culture (Sanchez-Peinado &
Pla-Barber, 2006). Therefore, CEOs usually favor
locations that are cognitively and culturally closer to
their country of origin. Specifically, managers are more
prone to enter foreign countries that speak the same lan-
guage, share the same colonial history, or have the same
technological advancement (Holburn & Zelner, 2010).
Given “the centrality of cultural values in shaping
individual and organizational behaviors” (Beugelsdijk
et al., 2018, p. 90), CD is likely to reduce CEOs’ interest
in heterogeneous countries. In fact, CD limits their con-
cern in evaluating some foreign markets as alternative
locations (Beugelsdijk et al., 2018). In sum, from a
rational perspective, “high CD reduces the probability of
investing in a country” (Beugelsdijk et al., 2018, p. 92),
and IB studies suggest the existence of a negative relation-
ship between CD and the likelihood of internationalizing.
Here, we contend that hubris affects location selection
for two reasons. First, hubris affects CEOs’ propensity to
enter culturally distant countries. Second, hubris alters
their perception of CD. The propensity to enter culturally
distant countries relates to the CEOs’ disposition to take
on the risk connected to the “lack of familiarity with the
host country and the ways of organizing and conducting
business” (Beugelsdijk et al., 2018, p. 95). Hubris mani-
fests in CEOs’ disposition to seize cognitively distant
opportunities that appear challenging but comparatively
quite rewarding (Gavetti, 2012). Hereditary narcissistic
factors linked to CEO hubris (Picone et al., 2014) emerge
in such circumstances, thereby leading to an extraordi-
nary risk-taking propensity (Lakey et al., 2008; Foster
et al., 2009; Grijalva & Harms, 2014). From this point of
view, we expect CEOs to be prone to enter culturally dis-
tant and thus risky foreign locations. Then, the negative
relationship between CD and the probability of investing
in a country becomes less important when a hubristic
CEO formulates international strategies. In fact,
hubristic CEOs may be prone to selecting challenging
locations to nurture their self-image (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007). Additionally, hubristic CEOs might be
challenged by the idea of convincing stakeholders to
“espouse a new, cognitively distant course of action,”
thereby inducing them “to adopt a new representation of
the firm and its position in the competitive space”
(Gavetti, 2012, p. 269). Given the level of CD between
home and foreign countries, hubristic CEOs are likely to
enter a culturally distant country.
The perception of CD concerns the CEOs’ capacity to
assess the consequences associated with internationalizing
to a location with a given degree of CD. When CD exists
between two countries, consequentially entailing high
uncertainty (Duncan, 1972), top executives face “the clas-
sic case of what […] Walter Mischel (1977) calls a ‘weak
situation’; that is, one in which the characteristics of the
situation are not clear-cut enough to dictate a course of
action” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996, p. 20). We argue
that when entering culturally distant markets, hubristic
CEOs fail to see the risk of their moves (Heidenreich
et al., 2015). In fact, they possess limited aptitude to
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sensibly analyze CD and show the bias in their subjective
perception of quasi-objective reality. Hence, hubristic
CEOs may well underestimate the challenges originating
from CD. While detecting the country’s CD requires a
systematic process of information gathering, hubristic
CEOs tend to overlook the quest for fit between the
firm’s value proposition and the target market. While
from a rational perspective, a negative relationship exists
between the CD characterizing two countries and the
likelihood that a firm may enter the foreign market,
hubris bias tends to reduce such a negative relationship.
CEOs affected by hubris tend to care much less about the
troubles of CD when selecting a given market. Therefore:
Proposition 2 CEOs’ hubris weakens the neg-
ative relationship between cultural distance
and the likelihood of entering a given market.
The choice of entry timing
The entry timing (i.e., the time when firms make the deci-
sion to enter a country with their products upon assessing
the effective timing of market penetration) in a new mar-
ket is critical to internationalization performance (Isobe
et al., 2000; Gaba et al., 2002; Zachary et al., 2015).
Early entries display the advantage of grasping market
opportunities ahead of competitors by accessing local
knowledge and consolidating the capabilities required to
anticipate rivals’ subsequent entry (Frynas et al., 2006).
In the same vein, early entry may also turn quite risky.
Usually, the sooner the entry, the less experienced and
knowledgeable the firm will be (at least in the local mar-
ket). Hence, from a rational perspective, the earlier the
entry vis-à-vis competitors, the more uncertain the out-
come will be (Li et al., 2003).
A key variable explaining the right timing for entering
a foreign market is, once again, the CD between the
country of origin and the target country. This is why
rational CEOs usually exhibit caution when investing in
risky locations. Risk is strictly connected to CD. In fact,
when firms decide to internationalize in culturally distant
countries, several aspects exert a potential impact on
investment performance. For instance, from the local
consumer’s perspective, entrants should leverage the pro-
posed product/service in view of their preferences; other-
wise, a deleterious “misfit” in combining product/service
and country may develop. From the entrant’s perspec-
tive, several issues connected to post-entry processes may
emerge, such as those regarding governance structures,
management styles, and national/corporate cultures
potentially affecting integration and recruiting policies.
Accordingly, the higher the CD between two countries is,
the longer the time a firm needs to enter a market. From
a rational perspective, the IB literature assumes that the
greater the cultural distance is, the longer it takes for a
firm to enter the target country (Blandon, 2001).
As previously argued, hubristic CEOs have low per-
ception of a given level of CD. Hubris might drive CEOs
to consider the target location only in view of the oppor-
tunity represented, regardless of CD (as previously
assessed in P2). Their self-confidence in managing the
entry process is likely to reset any perception of cultural
discrepancies. Thus, they might look at the target loca-
tion only as a new market to conquer and exploit ahead
of competitors. Hubristic CEOs are likely to attempt to
anticipate rivals so as to be the first ones to exploit mar-
ket potential. As such, they may fail to see reasons to
employ cautious approaches. Convinced of the unique
value of their strategic leadership, hubristic CEOs accept
as true the information and knowledge they can control
(Moore & Healy, 2008). Overall, the consequence is that
the firm enters the foreign country earlier than its rivals
because the CEOs underplay CD issues and prefer to
promptly set up affiliates abroad, thereby creating favor-
able conditions for another international success.
Therefore:
Proposition 3 CEOs’ hubris weakens the neg-
ative relationship between cultural distance
and fast entry timing.
The entry mode choice
A firm expanding internationally may penetrate a mar-
ket through various entry modes (Andersen, 1997). The
IB literature has developed various taxonomies of entry
modes. For instance, Brouthers & Hennart (2007)
distinguish them on the grounds of two key character-
istics: ownership mode (shared ownership vs. full
ownership) and establishment mode (greenfield
vs. acquisition).
Ownership mode
Two types of ownership characterize this entry mode:
(a) the shared-ownership mode, such as a joint venture
with a local partner or a partial acquisition; and (b) the
full-ownership mode, such as a greenfield wholly owned
subsidiary or a full acquisition. They mainly lead to the
emergence of important heterogeneities regarding
the amount of investment and the flexibility of divesti-
ture. Both the establishment of a joint venture and a par-
tial acquisition imply a limited investment vis-à-vis the
full-ownership mode because they are based on sharing
ownership and control with others. Moreover, they are
easier to divest. Shared-ownership arrangements
supported by interorganizational trust (Balboni et al.
a, 2018) seem to be effective when foreign locations are
characterized by uncertainties due to many differences
vis-à-vis the country of origin (e.g., CD) (Barkema
et al., 1996).
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From a rational perspective, the IB literature posits a
negative relationship between CD and the likelihood that
a firm will implement a full-ownership entry mode. In this
regard, Hennart & Larimo (1998) corroborate the idea
that firms prefer joint ventures rather than wholly owned
subsidiaries when the CD between home and foreign
countries is high. In fact, a higher cost and stronger rigid-
ity of the investment in a wholly owned subsidiary imply
a higher level of security that is usually not warranted by
a diverse, uncertain, and thus highly risky environment
(Brouthers, 2002; Tihanyi et al., 2005). Such a situation
encourages foreign investors to preferably opt for less
risky entry modes, such as a partnership (i.e., shared
ownership) with a local firm or with another entrant, to
share the risk.
However, because hubristic CEOs are little concerned
about CD, we expect them to opt for a full-ownership
entry mode, as they fail to recognize the cultural differ-
ences to be so widespread as to require external aid. It is
worth noting that the focal point is not the quality or
amount of knowledge that hubristic CEOs can manage.
Actually, given the level of knowledge, hubristic CEOs
are not likely to consider such knowledge in a critical
fashion, as they believe their decisions to be free of error.
Therefore, we argue that, when comparing two CEOs
with the same level of knowledge, the hubristic CEO is
less likely to consider the importance of CD when mak-
ing decisions. Therefore, the role of CD is weaker in a
hubristic CEO’s decision-making regarding the selection
of an ownership mode than in a rational CEO’s decision-
making.
Additionally, while rational CEOs usually enter
through prudential approaches when CD matters,
hubristic CEOs typically decide to invest straightfor-
wardly a large amount of financial resources
(Roll, 1986), as they are overoptimistic about the per-
formance outcome of their initiatives. Actually, they
prefer entering through a full-ownership entry mode
because they tend to downplay the challenges of CD
and, hence, overlook to fear the possibility of future
divestment/exit. By overlooking CD and the challenges
of internationalization, hubristic CEOs overestimate
their capacity to identify and grasp opportunities.
Accordingly, they underestimate the importance of CD
in IB. Furthermore, they underrate investment risks.
Put differently, the selection of the full-ownership entry
mode depends on hubristic CEOs’ overbearing pre-
sumption that their own valuations are always correct
(Roll, 1986). Therefore:
Proposition 4 CEOs’ hubris weakens the neg-
ative relationship between cultural distance
and the likelihood that a firm will implement
a full-ownership entry mode.
Establishment mode
When selecting the entry mode, a second significant deci-
sion regards the choice of the establishment mode, that
is, greenfield vs. acquisition (Brouthers &
Hennart, 2007). Rationally speaking, CEOs prefer the
acquisition mode, as it provides the opportunity to build
local links to limit the costs related to the liability of for-
eignness. Nonetheless, this advantage is frequently com-
pensated by the managerial costs associated with post-
acquisition integration (Demirbag et al., 2008). Thus,
according to the meta-conceptual appraisal of
Beugelsdijk et al. (2018, p. 92), we should rationally
expect CD to be “associated with firms preferring green-
fields vis-à-vis acquisitions.” In fact, acquisitions usually
represent an expensive and risky entry mode. They are
characterized by a considerable premium, high transac-
tion costs, and integration challenges affecting the two
previously independent firms (Lee & Lieberman, 2010).
From a rational perspective, IB posits that there exists a
negative relationship between CD and the likelihood that
a firm will implement an acquisition.
Hubristic CEOs show a low perception of the risk
connected to their absence of or limited familiarity with
the host country. As a consequence, we expect hubris to
lead to a very low perception of the integration complexi-
ties that are typical of acquisitions (Lee &
Lieberman, 2010), such as the integration of managerial
practices, decision-making processes, and many other
internal processes that are usually influenced by local cul-
ture. For instance, hubristic CEOs consider themselves
truly exceptional “integration managers” (Teerikangas
et al., 2011; Pisano et al., 2017). In other words, the
hubris bias weakens the typical negative relationship
between CD and the likelihood that a firm will imple-
ment an acquisition. Based on their previous experience
(Galavotti et al., 2017), CEOs believe that acquisition
success will be uniquely linked to their excellent guidance.
They attribute success to their strategic vision and effi-
cacy in leading the integration process.
The abovementioned arguments are strictly connected
to the symptoms of hubris in taking risks. However, they
capture only a part of the risk-taking motives (i.e., the
low level of risk perception). We also need to consider
hubristic CEOs’ desire to enhance their self-image. They
want to challenge the rational view about the necessary
prudence in entering a foreign country. This circumstance
occurs especially if the target foreign country is culturally
distant from the country of origin. Therefore:
Proposition 5 CEOs’ hubris weakens the neg-
ative relationship between cultural distance
and the likelihood that a firm will implement
an acquisition.
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International strategy performance
Our conceptual framework shows that hubristic CEOs
are generally motivated to undertake international
growth strategies. As CEO hubris affects location,
timing, and entry mode selection, it is natural to expect
that hubris might influence performance (Hiller &
Hambrick, 2005). Specifically, we posit that hubris can
lead to either negative or positive outlier performance
outcomes. Thus, we identify a dark side and a bright side
of hubris.
Regarding the dark side of hubris, to the extent that
hubristic CEOs engage in risky international strategies,
performance results could be pernicious (Hiller &
Hambrick, 2005).4 Hubristic CEOs’ goal to penetrate cul-
turally distant countries may be the fruit of pure fantasy,
as they often invest large amounts of financial resources.
When hubristic CEOs decide to expand their firms’
operations—for instance, through acquisitions—they typ-
ically overpay for their acquisitions by disbursing high
premiums (Lee & Lieberman, 2010). Ultimately, hubris
induces the pursuit of impulsive international strategies
with a flawed economic logic. In this case, the dark side
of hubris emerges with dire consequences (Hiller &
Hambrick, 2005). Even if the CEOs’ intent may be creat-
ing value for shareholders, hubris pushes them to make
strategic choices that are not always found to be correct
(Roll, 1986). Following such reasoning, hubris is fre-
quently seen as one of the most destructive errors of judg-
ment that CEOs can pursue (Russo &
Schoemaker, 1992). Arguably, as Hayward et al. (2010)
posit, hubris implies foreseeable consequences for strate-
gic outcomes, such as overentry into additional and unfa-
miliar markets (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999),
overinvestment, and overcommitment to exceedingly risky
projects (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier &
Tate, 2005a, 2005b; Hayward et al., 2010).
Regarding the bright side of hubris, building on the
behavioral theory of strategy, we support the emergence
of such a bright side because “superior opportunities tend
to be cognitively distant, and critical sources of superior
performance lie in the strategic leaders’ superior ability to
overcome the behavioral bounds that make it hard for
the average firm to pursue them” (Gavetti, 2012, p. 269).
In fact, we believe that culturally distant markets “are
likely to be less contested than more proximate ones and
are therefore potentially more rewarding” (Gavetti, 2012,
p. 269). We refer to the possibility that a hubristic CEO
may fortuitously (but correctly) conjecture the ’right’
international strategy to pursue. While it is likely that
hubristic CEOs will pursue internationalization by
targeting culturally distant countries, it is less likely that
competitors acting rationally will pursue similar interna-
tional strategies in those same locations. Thus, we expect
hubristic CEOs to select potentially more rewarding loca-
tions where a smaller amount of rivalry exists
(Gavetti, 2012). Additionally, cultural diversity may be a
source of strategic advantage for firms (Pisano &
Hitt, 2012), producing benefits such as greater creativity,
superior innovation, and better performing human capi-
tal. While the difficulties in formulating an in-depth anal-
ysis of the selected market may lead to paralysis,
hubristic CEOs may be able to discover unpredicted
returns generated by internationalization processes, as
they do not fret about launching risky strategies in cultur-
ally distant countries. Furthermore (see Proposition 3),
because hubristic CEOs underestimate the issues associ-
ated with planning internationalization paths, they may
pursue faster entries. When culturally distant markets are
not contested and are also potentially rewarding, rapid
entry is positively associated with market share gains.
However, the bright side of hubris is also related to a
magnificent firm vision that can strengthen personnel
efforts and immediate decision processes. Finally, given
the high resource commitment required by equity initia-
tives (see P4), an international acquisition may provide
higher returns. In such instances, the key element of firm
success is the formulation of an overambitious interna-
tional strategy in a culturally distant country that is pow-
erfully rewarding, attractive, inspiring, and stimulating
(Chemers et al., 2000; Luthans et al., 2001; Shipman &
Mumford, 2011). Taken together, such characteristics of
CEOs leading internationalization epitomize the bright
side of hubris in IB. Interestingly, Russo and
Schoemaker (1992, p. 16) express this notion by citing
Wolfgang Goethe, who said that “for a man to achieve
all that is demanded of him he must regard himself as
greater than he is.” This sentence by Goethe seems to jus-
tify the necessity of some level of hubris, just like a source
of energy that the individual needs to pursue and fulfill
her/his goals. We make reference to Steve Job’s well-
known quote: “Stay foolish. Never let go of your appetite
to go after new ideas, new experiences, and new adven-
tures.” Such reasoning explains why not all individuals
can be entrepreneurs or managers: in fact, rationality
would sometimes stop ordinary individuals from taking
risk. Hence, overall hubris may sometimes be seen as a
necessary quality of individuals, differentiating them
from all others. Consequently, this condition means that
the kind of stimulus originating from CEO hubris may
become a necessity or an advantage in certain situations.
Therefore, even though Greek mythology states that indi-
viduals are always punished for their sin of hubris,5 a
bright side of hubris may also exist. In a scenario that is
not governed by immutable laws such as those represen-
ted by markets, hubris is a term that may be
“resemanticized,” thereby presenting a good side
(Hayward et al., 2010; Picone et al., 2014; Zeitoun
et al., 2019). The good side of hubris is a high form of
ambition and resoluteness to fulfill one’s own wishes and
objectives. This condition becomes possible because the
positive side of hubris drives CEOs to never be satisfied
with what they achieve. Hubristic CEOs with a high sense
of superiority recognize international growth potential
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despite the extensive challenges of international strategies
due to CD. While we somewhat echo Hayward
et al. (2006), Picone et al. (2014), and Sundermeier
et al. (2020), our framework reveals that hubristic CEOs
may also be effective in performing strategic leadership
tasks, especially those concerning the formulation of
ambitious international strategies, thereby quickly man-
aging the entry process and ensuring high resource
commitment.
Drawing on Picone et al. (2014), we therefore empha-
size some of the positive outcomes of hubris, such as
quicker decision-making and entry timing, faster entry
mode selection and, occasionally, increased market
growth. However, such benefits often come at the high
cost of making shallow and inflexible strategic decisions.
Overall, hubristic CEOs are likely to exploit the potential
of international strategies in culturally distant countries,
and the outcomes of such strategies are extremely uncer-
tain to forecast and rationally assess (Judge et al., 2009;
Bollaert & Petit, 2010; Sundermeier et al., 2020). By
jointly considering both sides of hubris within IB, we pro-
pose the following:
Proposition 6 The higher CEOs’ hubris is, the
greater the probability that international
growth paths will show highly positive or
highly negative performance.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Drawing on the behavioral theory of strategy, this study
explores the impact of CEO hubris on the choice to enter
a foreign market and the main decisions associated with
international entry. First, we have argued about the
importance of considering the role of CEO hubris in
IB. While previous literature shows that CEO over-
confidence usually promotes firm internationalization
(Lin et al., 2020), we call attention to the joint effect of
overconfidence and pride (Judge et al., 2009) and argue
that hubristic CEOs are not just incline but even excited
to undertake international growth strategies
(an argument leading to Proposition 1). This consider-
ation stresses the importance of our core contribution,
that is, the exploration of the differences among CEOs
assessing their firm’s international strategy in the light of
hubris. When the decision to grow internationally is
made, despite the difficulties in tackling CD, “perhaps
owing to the centrality of cultural values in shaping indi-
vidual and organizational behaviors” (Beugelsdijk
et al., 2018, p. 89), our conceptual framework posits that
hubristic CEOs show a propensity toward investing in
culturally distant countries, penetrating them ahead of
competitors, and entering them through full-ownership
entry modes (i.e., acquisitions). As a consequence of such
a set of strategic choices, the international growth driven
by CEO hubris is affected by high performance volatility.
While this is a seemingly viable perspective of foreign
country entry, especially relative to culturally distant
countries, we are aware that the conceptual framework
does not dig deeper into the inner nature of hubristic
CEOs’ choices leading to positive or negative perfor-
mance. As such, it credits hubris a potential positive
value, thereby showing that, sometimes, hubris might
become critical for internationalization success. In this
regard, we call attention to the consideration that a high
level of volatility (risk) may be associated with either
exceptional or pernicious performance. When CEOs are
affected by hubris, their firms are likely to invest heavily
in international initiatives that end up with high losses.
However, in the same vein, they might also yield excep-
tional positive performance. This condition illustrates the
relationship between risk and return that is well known in
corporate finance. Nonetheless, we also stress that
hubristic CEOs’ risk-taking disposition is not only shaped
by their propensity to accept the high risk related to gran-
diose international strategies. In fact, hubristic CEOs
involuntarily fail to see the risks (e.g., those related to
CD) because they suffer from the “illusion of control.”
Hubris leads to the development of unlikely beliefs about
the success of an international growth path
(Schwenk, 1984). Drawing on Hayward et al. (2010,
p. 576), we argue that perhaps the prosperity of some
paths of internationalization “reflects an evolutionary
process in which more confident entrepreneurs undertake
more challenging and risky tasks with greater
conviction.”
By applying a fresh interpretive lens to inter-
nationalizing firms managed by hubristic CEOs, we con-
tribute to the behavioral theory of internationalization
(Powell et al., 2011). We show that CEO hubris is critical
for firms’ success or failure in IB. By being better aware
of hubris, CEOs may become more sensitive to how
hubris may ultimately shape their professional careers
(Petit & Bollaert, 2012; Picone et al., 2014).
Our contribution is threefold. First, we shed new light
on how considering hubris may improve our understand-
ing of managerial assessment and organizational judg-
ment in IB. While scholars have investigated the role of
hubris in entrepreneurship (Hayward et al., 2006;
Sundermeier et al., 2020), innovation (Tang et al., 2015;
Arena et al., 2018), and the cross-border acquisition envi-
ronment (Seth et al., 2000), internationalization strategies
have not yet received comparable consideration. As such,
we offer a specific focus on the value that studies on CEO
hubris may provide for understanding firm international-
ization paths. Arguably, this work complements recent
research on the determinants of internationalization at
the individual level, such as CEOs’ overconfidence (Lin
et al., 2020) and CEOs’ narcissism (Oesterle et al., 2016;
Agnihotri & Bhattacharya, 2019). Contrary to Lin
et al. (2020), we focus on hubris as a broader construct
including both overconfidence and excessive pride. Addi-
tionally, while the conceptualization of narcissistic
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TABLE 3 Key empirical approaches to look at CEO hubris/overconfidence and CEO narcissism




Acquisition strategy Indirect quantitative
estimation
Authors “derived a composite measure of
hubris (the ‘hubris factor’) from factor
analysis of the three hubris indication”
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997, p. 114).
The hubris indicators are: (a) recent
acquirer performance; (b) media praise
for the CEO; (c) CEO compensation
vis-à-vis the second-highest paid officer
Kroll et al. (2000) CEO hubris as antecedent of the weakness
of strategic actions
Qualitative estimation Authors use a narrative approach. They
illustrate the sources of Napoleon’s
hubris and then discuss how
Napoleon’s hubristic choices were
overambitious and his analyses
overoptimistic
Tang et al. (2015) Innovation strategy Direct quantitative
estimation
“In the survey, each CEO was asked to
evaluate his or her firm’s most recent
financial performance (…), using a
5-point scale (…). The actual
performance was measured by return
on sales (ROS) for that same half year,
as reported by each CEO in the survey.
Since both the subjectively anchored
evaluation and the concretely anchored
response depended strongly on the
industry, both values were adjusted by
subtracting from them the respective
mean values of all sampled firms in the
same industry. To make the two
measures comparable, both the
subjective evaluation and the ROS were
converted to z scores. Executive hubris
was captured by the z score of the
subjective evaluation minus the z score
of the ROS, and the greater the
difference, the greater the executive
hubris” (Tang et al., 2015, p. 1705–
1706)
1. Chen et al. (2015) Firms’ responses to corrective feedback Indirect quantitative
estimation
Authors use three different measures of
overconfidence: (a) the overconfidence
media as “an annual measure based on
CEOs’ portrayal in the media”;
(b) overconfidence options as “a binary
measure based on CEOs’ personal
portfolio decisions”; (c), overconfidence
success as “a continuous annual
measure based on an index of three
antecedent variables that might
influence a CEO’s overconfidence” on
the basis of Hayward &
Hambrick (1997) (Chen, Crossland, &
Luo, 2015, p. 1521–1,522)
Arena et al., 2018 Environmental Innovation Indirect quantitative
estimation
Authors use a “summary measure of CEO
hubris through a principal component
analysis of the three proxies: (i) the
media-based measure of CEO hubris
(CEO HUBRIS PRESS); (ii) the CEO
relative compensation (CEO HUBRIS
COMP); (iii) the CEO photo (CEO
HUBRIS PHOTO)” (Arena
et al., 2018, p. 324)
(Continues)
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behavior offered by Agnihotri and Bhattacharya (2019,
p. 890) is “largely driven by self-interest, overconfidence,
and high-risk propensity,” we focus on a narrow con-
struct. For instance, hubris bias is not necessarily related
to managerial opportunism. However, our argument
about the link between hubris and internationalization
somewhat echoes the findings of Lin et al. (2020) and
Agnihotri & Bhattacharya (2019). We enrich the debate
by explaining why and how, when the decision to enter a
foreign country is made, hubris may bias the key IB
decisions (e.g., the selection of the target location, the
right timing of the entry, and the most suitable entry
mode) and their impact on firm performance.
Interestingly, we connect our research to Oesterle
et al. (2016). While Oesterle et al. (2016) expect that
narcissistic CEOs promote business activities in high-risk
markets, we offer an explanation of the role of hubris in
IB by focusing on the assessment of cultural distance. In
other words, we advance an explanation of why hubristic
CEOs prefer entry into cognitively distant and high-risk
markets.
Second, building on the assumption that hubris has
two sides, we posit that its bright side also plays a rele-
vant role in internationalization strategies. We contribute
to the IB literature by arguing that, as concerns interna-
tional growth, hubris offers a significant conundrum,
simultaneously displaying positive and negative features.
We therefore supplement IB inquiry by contending that,
within internationalization contexts, some circumstances
may arise in which executives need to be highly confident
simply because the performance advantages of hubristic
behaviors may overcome the typical concerns of judg-
ment inaccuracy. We argue that IB is a context in which
the insights of Hayward et al. (2010, p. 576) are eventu-
ally confirmed: “there may be many situations where
heedful and risk conscious actors should be highly confi-
dent, and at high risk of overconfidence, because the lon-
ger term benefits of such confidence overwhelm any
concern for an error of judgment.”
Third, we contribute to the CD literature in IB. By
focusing on the relationships between CD and interna-
tional strategic choices and by considering hubris as a
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Source Research area Method to measure Operationalization of the hubris/
overconfidence constructs




Authors “sought out all news articles that
mention each of the CEOs of our
sample firms in a range of major
publications including The New York
Times, Business Week, The Financial
Times, The Economist, and The Wall
Street Journal (…) [they] counted the
total number of times that the CEOs
were described by the press using terms
that suggested conservatism (‘reliable,’
‘cautious,’ ‘conservative,’ ‘practical,’
‘frugal,’ ‘steady,’ ‘not confident,’ or
‘not optimistic’). (…) [They]
constructed a CEO Hubris Continuous
measure by taking the difference
between the number of times the
‘confident’ terms appeared, the number
of times the ‘conservatism’ terms
appeared, scaling that by the sum of the
two numbers for a specific CEO” (Tang
et al., 2015, p. 1346–1347)
3. Source Research Area Method to
Measure
Operationalization of the narcissism construct
Chatterjee &
Hambrick (2007)
Narcissistic CEOs and effects





“Indicators of narcissistic tendencies are as follows: (1) the
prominence of the CEO’s photograph in the company’s annual
report; (2) the CEO’s prominence in the company’s press releases;
(3) the CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns in interviews;
(4) the CEO’s cash compensation divided by that of the second-
highest paid executive in the firm; and (5) the CEO’s non-cash
compensation divided by that of the second-highest-paid







Authors “follow the prevailing instrument for measuring narcissism,
the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), through third-party
ratings of video samples of CEOs” (Petrenkoet al., 2016, p. 268).
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mechanism that influences CEOs’ decisions, we offer
a broader picture of the key processes through which
hubris impinges on internationalization decisions. In fact,
our conceptual framework portrays the most common
actions affected by hubris and the reasons why and how
hubristic CEOs generally tend to overlook some
(rationally relevant) cultural aspects. Specifically, the
framework confirms the insights of Lai et al. (2017) on
the influence of CEO hubris on ownership choice in for-
eign market entry decisions and advances additional
knowledge by unveiling one key driver of such a decision;
that is, the interplay between hubris bias and CD.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
We organize our suggestions for future related research
in three subsections.
Extension of the conceptual framework on
hubris-driven international growth
Regarding the extension of the conceptual framework
advanced in this article, we call attention to the impor-
tance of understanding the role of CEO hubris in IB,
with specific attention to the following issues: (a) the
factors affecting the choices related to international
growth; (b) firm legitimacy crises entangled in rethink-
ing its international strategy; and (c) the role of top
management teams in mitigating the effect of CEO
hubris on IB choices. First, our conceptual framework
focuses on CD, a key factor affecting choices related
to international growth. As explained in the literature
review, CD “permeates all stages and aspects of a
firm’s expansion and operation abroad and can only
be addressed, at least to some extent, with appropriate
internationalization strategies” (Beugelsdijk et al., 2018,
p. 95). Nonetheless, we acknowledge that other
important factors may in fact affect the choices related
to international growth and should be analyzed in-
depth.
Second, the conceptual framework prompts the possi-
bility of igniting a destructive spiral linking hubris-driven
international choices to new grandiose strategies. We
know that hubristic CEOs frequently fail to perceive the
latent dangers behind their initiatives. Moreover, they
usually behave defensively and are averse to constructive
criticism (Chen et al., 2015). Under the external condi-
tions of uncertainty, hubristic CEOs persistently focus on
their own goals, thereby reinforcing the decision to
invest, which eventually leads to higher losses. Previous
research conceptualizes this spiral as an “escalation of
commitment” (Staw, 1981) or as the “hubris trap”
(Dagnino et al., 2013). However, decision makers’ high-
flying sense of invincibility will stop if unrealistic expecta-
tions are followed by legitimacy crises that entail the
rethinking of strategy, as well as a re-examination of
the CEOs’ position and credibility. Since strategic
leadership is grounded in power symbolism and social
construction (Hambrick & Pettigrew, 2001), we call for
further studies exploring how hubristic CEOs construe
themselves as exceptional leaders and maintain the trust
of the financial market.
Finally, while our conceptual framework focuses on
the CEO, we confirm that we are aware that it over-
looks the inner dynamics of top management teams
(TMTs). Therefore, we call for studies on the cumula-
tive effect of hubris within TMTs. It would be worth-
while to look at the role and effect of hubristic TMTs
(e.g., vis-à-vis the CEO). For instance, a viable research
question would concern whether TMT heterogeneity
mitigates the destructive effect of CEO hubris. Another
relevant question consistent with the focus of our paper
would concern how culture may influence (or shape)
the dynamics of the decision process among TMTs and
hubristic CEOs. With a specific focus on the psycho-
logical foundations of family business (Picone
et al., 2021), a further issue may concern how family
background may influence (or shape) the decision pro-
cess dynamics of family TMTs and hubristic
family CEOs.
Conceptual and empirical challenges of hubris-
driven international growth
Given that we have presented a conceptual framework of
hubris-driven international growth, we recognize that the
next step is to perform empirical investigations. First,
since the choices of internationalization are typical
multicriteria decision-making problems (e.g., regarding
location choice), we call for studies that, by using the
aforementioned approach, can corroborate or challenge
our framework (Turskis et al., 2012; Keshavarz
Ghorabaee et al., 2016).
Second, we encourage future inquiries to apply a vari-
ety of empirical research methods to assess hubris in
IB. Extant studies present both indirect measures of
hubris (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) and estimations
performed through surveys (Tang et al., 2015) that may
be appropriately used to this end. Table 3 shows the
operationalization of the hubris/overconfidence construct
used in such work. Additionally, we acknowledge that
hubris and narcissistic behavior may have some common
features, but they are different constructs (Tang
et al., 2018; Zhu & Chen, 2015). In Table 3, we also
report the operationalization of the narcissism construct
used in a couple of inquiries. The multiple ways to
operationalize hubris (overconfidence) and narcissism
confirm that both narcissism and its operationalization
are quite questionable. In fact, Tang et al. (2015, p. 1718)
state that “management forecast errors may stem from
multiple sources, with overconfidence being just one of
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them.” While we recognize the importance of direct
measures of psychological attributes, given the multiple
practical obstacles to find personality data directly ema-
nating from managers (Gerstner et al., 2013), we look
favorably to recent methodological frames, such as the
so-called “videometric approach” that Petrenko
et al. (2016) have recently proposed.
Third, we observed that internationalization strategies
run by hubristic CEOs show higher performance volatil-
ity than those run by nonhubristic CEOs. In this vein, a
suitable empirical approach would be to scrutinize the
internationalization performance of entry into a single
country, where hubris-driven firms might exhibit high
performance volatility.
Finally, since the role of hubris is likely to have devas-
tating consequences for firms, we underscore that quanti-
tative research by itself would only barely allow us to
detect how the exceptionally positive performance led by
hubristic CEOs may endure over time and why positive
performance may emerge. From this perspective, scholars
may be interested in performing additional qualitative
studies showing the origin, process, and evolution of the
extreme performance of internationalizing firms led by
hubristic CEOs.
Integration of the conceptual framework on
hubris-driven international growth with other
conceptual perspectives
While we have sketched the rudiments of a hubris-driven
understanding of firm internationalization, we also
acknowledge that we have fallen short of looking at other
relevant explanations of internationalization that seem
complementary to the hubris hypothesis. First, agency
theory elucidations of internationalization focusing on
managerial opportunism may be of interest for future
inquiry. Actually, opportunism and hubris are distinct
constructs that may coexist. If they coexist, the
misallocation of resources is led not only by an explicit
managerial goal, but also by CEOs’ cognitive hubris.
While the role of agency theory in firm internationaliza-
tion has recently received some attention (e.g., Dagnino
et al., 2019), additional exploration is certainly required,
especially in connection with the hubris hypothesis.
Finally, by focusing on hubris-driven internationali-
zation, we have overlooked the possible trade-off or com-
plementarity existing between a firm’s international and
domestic growth in light of desperation theory (Kim
et al., 2011). As our conceptual framework shows, the IB
strategy inspired by CEOs’ hubris may generate impor-
tant losses. Hubristic CEOs who are focused on interna-
tionalization may continue to aggressively engage in
growth even when they can achieve the same objective by
operating domestically. These hubristic CEOs may
perceive that they will not achieve their self-confident
growth goals without pursuing internationalization.
Therefore, they may still desperately seek internationali-
zation opportunities even if they experience a relatively
high level of domestic growth. Further research would
certainly profit from exploring the underlying processes
leading hubristic CEOs to become desperate to grow
internationally, including why and how they are willing
to take on the high risk of seeking such international
growth opportunities.
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ENDNOTES
1For instance, if a potential entrant has limited time to exploit an oppor-
tunity, the fastest solution may be acquiring an incumbent firm
(Hennart & Park, 1993). This occurs because alternative equity entry
modes are usually overly time-demanding and require more prudential
approaches. Consequently, the entry timing has a direct influence on the
entry mode selection (Shimizu et al., 2004). Furthermore, as concerns
the selection of the right international entry mode, it is crucial to under-
stand the differences among entry modes to grasp the effectiveness of an
international decision-making process (Newburry & Zeira, 1997) or the
combined/sequential use of different modes (Meschi, Metais, &
Shimizu, 2018).
2Hubris has been widely used interchangeably with overconfidence. For
instance, Tang et al. (2015a) consider hubris and overconfidence to be
synonymous, since they are “associated with similar theoretical mecha-
nisms” (p. 1341). Other authors (Tourish, 2020) propose alternative defi-
nitions of hubris. As reported in Table 1, hubris may also be considered
as overconfidence combined with extreme pride (Judge, Piccolo, &
Kosalka, 2009; Picone, Dagnino, & Minà, 2014). In turn, over-
confidence appears to be linked to narcissistic traits (Campbell,
Goodie, & Foster, 2004) that have a hereditary background (Petrides
et al., 2011). As narcissistic people hold an ostentatious self-concept and
a condescending attitude (Petrides et al., 2011), they are persistently
and incessantly committed “to confirm their idealized and grandiose
self-views” (John & Robins, 1994, p. 217). John and Robins (1994) and
Campbell, Goodie, and Foster (2004) found that narcissistic traits are
associated with individual differences in self-perception biases.
3We stress the difference between two constructs: managerial opportun-
ism and managerial hubris (Haynes, Campbell, & Hitt, 2014; Haynes,
Hitt, & Campbell, 2015). In both cases, a misallocation of resources and
a disruption of value to shareholders may occur. However, the con-
structs have different meanings. Managerial opportunism emerges when
executives, armed with favorable asymmetry of information, pursue
their self-interests. Managerial hubris takes into consideration the firm’s
decision-making process. In such a context, the misallocation of
resources is consequent to the overestimation of benefits and the under-
estimation of costs in strategy analysis.
4While it might be fruitful to take fast decisions in order to stay ahead
of competitors, we ought to consider that speed may be the driver of
bad decisions, especially when achieving speedy decisions means to give
up to perform the information-gathering process as a whole or part of it
(Kahneman et al., 1982; Baum & Wally, 2003).
5This condition occurs because overconfidence is deemed a sin against
the immutable laws of nature or laws imposed by gods.
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